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  We know relatively little about the economic impacts of “insignificant” rules 
because they are not typically analyzed. Yet, these rules could be important. We provide 
an economic analysis of one proposed rule to control hazardous air pollutants which is 
not considered to be economically significant. This rule is of particular interest because it 
is one of the first in a long series of rules that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
will consider for limiting hazardous air pollutant emissions. Our analysis suggests that 
the proposed controls that EPA has considered are not likely to pass a benefit-cost test. 
We recommend that an agency base its decision to allocate additional resources to 
benefit-cost analysis on the expected value of the improved information. In addition, 
agencies should consider applying a rule of thumb that would specify a threshold level of 
risk reduction that needs to be achieved before some kinds of regulation are considered.  
 
Key Words: Benefit-Cost Analysis, Regulation, Risk Analysis, Environmental 
Economics 
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The Economic Significance of “Insignificant” Rules 
 





  Scholars know relatively little about the economic impacts of “minor” or 
“insignificant” rules because they are not typically analyzed.
1 Each of these rules costs 
less than $100 million annually, but at least some of them could be important. To 
illustrate, we provide an economic analysis of one proposed rule to control hazardous air 
pollutants that is not considered to be economically significant. 
  Part of the U.S. Clean Air Act deals with the regulation of hazardous air 
pollutants. The laws governing the regulation of these pollutants require the application 
of maximum available control technology standards. In addition, the Act requires that the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) address the “residual risk” that remains 
after the implementation of these standards. EPA’s task is two-fold: to provide “an ample 
margin of safety to protect public health” and to prevent, considering costs and other 
factors, an adverse environmental effect.  
To ensure an ample margin of safety, EPA has recently proposed two ways of 
addressing residual risk for the synthetic organic chemical manufacturing industry (EPA, 
2006). The first is to maintain the status quo and the second is to introduce three 
additional control measures.  EPA’s proposal is not considered to be economically 
significant, one which, as defined by Executive Order 12866, could have an annual effect 
on the economy of $100 million or more. This means that the preparation of a full 
regulatory impact analysis that weighs the costs and benefits of the proposed rule was not 
required.  
If the current maximum available control technology standards are effective at 
reducing the large risks, there may only be very small remaining risk reductions that can 
be achieved with residual risk rules, and their likely costs may outweigh their likely 
                                                 
1 We use the phrases “minor” and “insignificant” interchangeably. 2 
benefits.
2 Indeed, some earlier scholarship questions whether the initial efforts to regulate 
hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act were likely to be worth the cost 
(Portney, 1990). A closer look at one of these rules could illustrate their potentially 
excessive costs and thereby help inform future legislative and regulatory decisions. 
The potential cumulative effect of minor rules could be important. In 2005, the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—which is the office within the 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) responsible for reviewing rules—
reviewed over 528 minor rules, of which 209 were final rules (RegInfo.gov). The rules 
reviewed by OIRA probably represent only a small percentage of the total number of 
minor rules written and passed by agencies each year.
3  Even if each rule has a small 
impact, say in the tens of millions of dollars, such rules may be important in the 
aggregate. Furthermore, if these rules are important from an economic and social 
standpoint, it raises at least the possibility that they deserve closer scrutiny. On the other 
hand, some scholars have pointed out that doing more economic analysis need not result 
in better outcomes (Lave, 1996). This paper will address this issue, providing what we 
believe is the most sensible approach to the analysis of minor rules. 
One attempt to examine the relative impact of major and minor rules was done by 
OMB (2004) for a select group of agencies that were more likely to estimate costs and 
benefits for minor rules.
4 OMB found that a high percentage of the costs were due to the 
major rules, which might imply that the cumulative impact of minor rules is small. 
OMB’s analysis excluded EPA, the agency whose major rules were responsible for a 
majority of the costs and benefits generated by U.S. federal regulation in the last ten 
years (OMB, 2006).  By closely examining an EPA minor rule, and providing one of the 
first benefit-cost analyses of such a rule, this research note illustrates that EPA minor 
rules may have more substantial effects than previously thought. . 
                                                 
2 EPA is required to assess the residual risk remaining and promulgate standards if the excess individual 
cancer risk is higher than one in one million.   
3 There is no one database of all minor rules. No agency is required to record all minor rules in their 
agenda. OIRA reviews only the most important minor rules, those that are “significant” (OMB, 2001). This 
information was confirmed in a telephone conversation between Caroline Cecot and John C. Thomas, 
Executive Director of the Regulatory Information Service Center, on August 9
th, 2006.  
4 OMB (2004) looked at three agencies: the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 
Stikkers (2004) also includes minor rules in his study of the process of rulemaking, concluding that they 
attract on average an order of magnitude fewer comments than major rules. 
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We have three objectives: first, to provide a brief economic analysis of EPA’s 
proposal; second, to consider how both analysis of and regulation by minor rules could be 
improved; and third, to consider the issue of whether “insignificant” rules are worth 
studying on a larger scale. 
  We use estimates presented by EPA in the Federal Register and rely on some 
simplifying assumptions regarding benefits and costs. Our purpose here is not to provide 
a definitive benefit-cost analysis of EPA’s proposed rule, but rather to illustrate how the 
agency’s analysis of such a minor rule could be improved. We conclude that with a little 
more effort, the analysis of the rule we examine could be improved significantly, and we 
illustrate how that might be done. Furthermore, we argue that “insignificant” rules are in 
general worth exploring in more detail to examine their broader economic implications. 
  Section 2 of this paper presents an economic analysis of the two regulatory 
options proposed by EPA to regulate hazardous air pollutants from synthetic organic 
chemical manufacturing, as well as an analysis of each control measure separately. 
Section 3 analyzes EPA’s actions, providing recommendations for similar rules that do 
not rise above the significance threshold. Section 4 outlines a strategy for analyzing 
insignificant rules and also suggests an alternative method for screening regulations that 
would rely on a de minimis threshold for risk reductions. Section 5 presents our 
conclusions and suggests areas for future research. 
 
2. Estimating Benefits and Costs of EPA’s Proposal 
 
  In a proposal issued in 2006, EPA considered two options for regulating 
hazardous air pollutants from the synthetic organic chemical manufacturing industry. 
Option 1 proposed imposing no additional controls. We take this as the baseline and 
assume that the net benefits of this strategy are zero. Option 2 included three control 
measures. These measures involved controlling emissions from storage tanks, controlling 
emissions from process vents, and decreasing the percentage of leaking valves. 
EPA’s residual risk assessment found that the maximum individual lifetime 
cancer risk exceeds one in one million in many individual manufacturing plants, but is at 
most 100 in one million for all plants. EPA did not expect any significant non-cancer 
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health effects. The annual cancer incidence for the entire exposed population was 
estimated at 0.1 cases per year. EPA also found that health threats by acute inhalation 
exposure are “very unlikely.” EPA estimated that Option 2 would reduce annual cancer 
incidence by 0.01, or would prevent one cancer case every 100 years for the exposed 
population by decreasing the tons of hazardous air pollutant emissions.  
  Table 1 provides information on annualized costs, annualized benefits, and net 
benefits.
5 In addition, it provides estimates of costs, benefits, and net benefits per ton of 
volatile organic compounds (VOC) removed, of which the hazardous air pollutants are a 
subset.
6 To conduct our benefit-cost analysis, we use EPA’s estimates from a number of 
documents and make many critical assumptions.
7   The results for EPA’s proposal are 
given in Table 1 under the final column labeled “Option 2.” This column also 
corresponds to the sum of the annualized costs and benefits of the three control measures 
where appropriate. 
We consider three different discount rates—3 percent, 5 percent, and 7 percent.
8 
There are two sets of figures under each discount rate scenario.  First, there are total 
annual costs, benefits, and net benefits (which are computed by subtracting costs from 
benefits).  Second, there are annual costs, benefits, and net benefits on a per ton basis. For 
all three discount rates, the net benefits per ton are negative, which suggests that Option 2 
is not likely to pass a benefit-cost test under the modeling assumptions and data used 
here.  
  EPA presented Option 2 in terms of implementing all three control measures at 
the same time. In Table 1, we also consider the costs and benefits of the control measures 
individually. We do this because it allows us to compare the economic impacts of these 
measures to each other and to consider the effect of using combinations of these control 
measures. 
                                                 
5 For simplicity, numbers are generally rounded to one significant digit. All dollar numbers are converted to 
2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to adjust for inflation.  
6 Considering only the cancer risk reductions due to the HAP reductions, the cost per cancer case prevented 
of Option 2 is more than $1.3 billion. This calculation is misleading, however, since it does not consider the 
additional ozone reduction benefits due to the reduction of total volatile organic compounds.   
7 For details on these assumptions, as well as how we conducted our sensitivity analysis, please see the 
Appendix. 
8 EPA cost numbers were reported using a 7 percent discount rate. We use 3 percent and 5 percent as well 
to explore how the results might change. 
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From Table 1, we see that controlling emissions from storage tanks has a positive 
net benefit per ton using the high benefit value, but a negative net benefit (i.e., net cost) 
using the low benefit value. The other two emission controls have net costs under both 
scenarios. We conclude that two of the control measures are not likely to pass a benefit-
cost test, but the controls on storage tanks might pass. 
Table 2 presents the analysis in present value terms based on the assumption that 
the regulation is in place for 30 years. The results suggest that EPA’s Option 2 could 
result in a present value net cost in the high tens to low hundreds of millions of dollars. 




3. A Critique of EPA’s Analysis 
 
  We support EPA’s efforts to consider a wide range of control alternatives, but the 
agency could have done more. For example, because the minimal risk reduction did not 
warrant the high costs, EPA rejected a possible control measure for process wastewater 
streams that had an average cost of $410,000 per ton of reduced hazardous air pollutants. 
The agency, however, focuses on Option 2 in its presentation of results because that is the 
only regulatory alternative that affects cancer incidence. We believe that EPA should 
have at least considered in more detail the benefits and costs of controlling storage tanks 
alone because these appear to have the possibility of yielding positive net benefits. 
  EPA also focused exclusively on command-and-control alternatives. Part of the 
Clean Air Act calls for recommendations for legislation regarding the remaining risk 
from hazardous air pollutants.  EPA, however, determined that the current legislation 
provides “a comprehensive and flexible strategy for addressing a variety of air toxics risk 
concerns” (EPA, 1999). In our view, EPA should have considered other alternatives. 
There could be much to be gained by at least considering market-based alternatives for 
reducing hazardous air pollutants. If the activity in question involves relatively small 
changes in risk, and overall risks are being reduced, some kind of trading regime could be 
appropriate (such as the sulfur dioxide allowance trading program) (Stavins, 1998). Such 
                                                 
9 Net costs are calculated as total costs minus total benefits. 
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an approach has the potential to reduce hazardous air pollutants at a lower cost than 
conventional, command-and-control alternatives. For example, one might allow trading 
of different kinds of pollutants based on a trading ratio that reflected damages. At a 
minimum, one might consider applying a plant-wide bubble for all hazardous air 
pollutant emissions based on toxicity. That would allow emission sources within a plant 
to take advantage of differences in marginal costs of pollution control. 
  Although it may not be worthwhile for EPA to implement an emissions trading 
regime for the synthetic organic chemical manufacturing industry, it may be desirable to 
do this on a larger scale, perhaps considering an approach to trading VOC on a regional 
basis.  In the future, Congress should take these alternatives into account when designing 
new air pollution legislation. 
 
4. Analyzing Minor Rules 
 
Analysis of minor rules serves several purposes. One is to help determine the net 
benefits of particular options. A second purpose is to highlight other approaches that may 
be more efficient or equitable.  Scholars have debated whether most minor rules are 
likely to pass a benefit-cost test (see, e.g., Parker, 2003; Hahn, 2004), but that debate has 
so far lacked much data.  Here, we provide some specific recommendations for how to 
approach the analysis of minor rules in order both to improve agency decision making 
and advance scholarly research. 
 
All minor rules  
 
  The public has a right to know the underlying rationale for a regulation. Thus, a 
regulatory agency should be required to note the rationale for regulation. This rationale 
should generally specify the market failure that is being addressed, such as pollution. In 
addition, an agency should at least qualitatively explain why benefits are likely to be 
greater than costs (Arrow et al., 1996). To comply with this recommendation, agencies 
would be required to expend only the most modest resources. It is similar to a new 
amendment President George W. Bush made to Executive Order 12866, which subjects 
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non-binding agency guidance documents to some of the same standards as federal 
regulations (Hahn & Litan, 2007). 
 
Minor rules with completed analyses   
 
In general, the agency should provide a benefit-cost analysis similar to the one 
presented here when doing so would require only a modest additional effort.  In this 
particular case, for example, EPA had already completed the cost analysis and risk 
assessment, which is likely to be the most expensive part of the preparation of a full 
regulatory impact analysis. The fact that an agency is not required to compare costs with 
benefits should not keep it from conducting a benefit-cost analysis when the agency has 
already developed the individual components needed for such an analysis. 
More generally, the agency may want to consider applying certain rules of thumb 
to its minor rules, as a way of conducting even a crude benefit-cost analysis.  One way of 
simplifying the analysis is to make rough estimates of the benefits that could result from 
certain kinds of pollution. Such an analysis could use some simple rules of thumb for 
benefits or costs (or both), as was done here in the case of benefits. Benefits transfer 
methodology, or using available information in another context, may be helpful, though it 
does have its drawbacks since the benefits would not be calibrated for the specific 
circumstance (Kirchhoff et al., 1997).  
 
Allocating analytical resources to minor rules  
 
  Of course, not every minor rule will already have a completed analysis or be 
linked to relevant benefits through benefits-transfer. Doing an economic analysis from 
scratch may take significant resources. The Congressional Budget Office (1997) found 
that the average cost of an economic analysis for a major rule is $700,000, ranging from 
about $18,000 to $8 million. We therefore recommend that an agency base its decision to 
allocate additional resources to benefit-cost analysis on the expected value of the 
improved information. An agency should consider using lower cost and lower quality 
benefit-cost analyses for problems in which the value of improved information is likely to 
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be lower (Raiffa, 1968). In many cases, an analysis from scratch will not be worth it. At 
the same time, the analysis of a novel problem with implications for future rules could be 
worthwhile.  
  The decision on the level of analysis should probably be based on the specific rule 
and not on an arbitrary cut-off. The current cost threshold of $100 million for analysis 
may or may not prove to be a reasonable rule of thumb. For example, there are some 
major proposed regulations for which the agency has little flexibility in policy design 
given statutory constraints. Thus, OIRA may want to devote fewer resources to doing an 
economic analysis of those regulations and more to other rules where analysis could 
make a real difference in policy design.  
 
Minor rules with de minimis risk reduction 
 
  There is an alternative way of thinking about the regulatory issues raised here that 
could involve the application of a kind of risk reduction threshold approach. The idea is 
that if the regulation has only a very small impact on risk, and its primary aim is to 
reduce that risk, then it probably is not worth considering. In the case of EPA’s hazardous 
air pollutant proposal, the agency estimated that one cancer case would be prevented 
every 100 years. Preventing 0.01 cancers each year is unlikely to pass a benefit-cost 
analysis unless the costs are also very small or other significant benefits exist. 
The agency or Congress could consider applying a rule of thumb that would 
specify a threshold level of risk reduction that needs to be achieved before some kinds of 
regulation are considered (Adler & Posner, 2006).  It would then be the agency’s burden 
to show why that small risk reduction is worth pursuing in the specific circumstance.  The 
basic idea is that when not much is at stake, there may be little reason to regulate.  
Similar proposals have been made for dealing with risks that are very small 
(Sunstein, 2002). In particular, some scholars have advocated not regulating risks that are 
viewed as “de minimis,” or extremely small (Byrd III & Lave, 1987; Whipple, 1987; 
Wilson, 1988; Rosenthal et al., 1992). Our approach is related to the de minimis risk idea, 
but not the same thing. If the total risk being addressed is tiny, or de minimis, the risk 
reduction due to a regulation focusing on that category will necessarily be tiny. Thus, the 
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benefits would exceed costs only if the costs were similarly tiny. Tiny risk reductions 
from a regulation might also occur, however, when the total risk being addressed is larger 
but the proposed regulation is simply not expected to reduce that risk to any great extent. 
Simple rules of thumb like de minimis risk and our proposed de minimis risk 
reduction threshold are not without their problems. In particular, they may not necessarily 
maximize net benefits in all cases. In a world in which analysis is not costless and 
agencies’ budgets are constrained, however, rules of thumb may represent a useful way 
of setting priorities. They would also give agencies an incentive to combine rules or other 
policy measures so that the overall risk reduction impacts were larger. In the hazardous 
air pollutants rulemaking we have examined, EPA was required by Congress to assess the 
residual risk and promulgate standards if the excess risk rose above one in one million for 
a maximally exposed person. We believe that such inflexible legislative measures could 




  We know relatively little about the economic impacts of minor rules. Yet, these 
rules could be important, particularly considering the aggregate impacts of a large 
number of them. Moreover, small rules are only one category of regulation where our 
knowledge is quite limited. There are a host of other activities, including registration, 
licensing decisions, and regulatory guidance, where the economic benefits and costs of 
agency decisions are not well understood.  
  We provide an economic analysis of one proposed rule that is not economically 
significant. Though this rule might not be representative of all small rules, it may be 
representative of residual risk rules.  EPA considered two options in this rule: retaining 
the current set of controls, or adding three additional control measures. On the basis of 
our preliminary analysis, we would not suggest adding the three additional control 
measures because they appear to fail a benefit-cost test.  However, one of these control 
measures may pass a benefit-cost test and be appropriate for EPA to require synthetic 
organics chemical manufacturers to implement. 
   10 
  EPA and Congress may want to consider revising the approach to managing 
residual risks from hazardous air pollutants. If the benefits of reducing these risks are 
small in comparison to the costs of reducing them, as the preliminary analysis of one rule 
here suggests, such regulation may not be warranted. If the maximum risk reductions do 
not exceed a certain threshold, the agency may do best simply by not moving forward 
with such rules. If Congress nonetheless believes a regulation is warranted for other 
reasons, it should allow or even encourage the agency to consider more flexible market-
based alternatives for reducing such risks. 
  We recommend that regulatory agencies base their decisions to allocate additional 
resources to benefit-cost analysis on the expected value of the improved information. In 
the application considered here, this implies using crude estimates of benefits and 
simplifying the cost calculation. We think that agencies should develop methods and 
statistics that would make it easier to implement such analyses where appropriate. One 
example, relevant to the case of residual risks, is to develop a table that provides a dollar 
value per ton of pollutant reduced. 
  We believe that it is important for scholars to consider the impact of small rules at 
all levels of government. One way of addressing the problem would be to choose a list of 
small rules from a variety of agencies at random and examine their economic 
consequences. This research could provide insights into the potential economic 
importance of such rules. It could also provide information on how to utilize analysis and 
analytical resources more effectively to improve public policy. 
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Table 1 
Estimates of the Costs and Benefits of Controlling Volatile Organic Compounds on 
an Annual and Per Ton Basis (in thousands of 2003 dollars) 





Valves  Option 2 
Annualized Cost    200 3,000 10,000  13,200
Annualized Benefit  Low  100 700 1,000  1,800
 High 600 3,000 5,000  8,600
Net Annual Benefits  Low -40 -3,000 -9,000  -12,040
  High 400 -200 -5,000 -4,800
Annualized tons of VOC  210 1,100 1,600 2,910
Cost/ton   0.8 3 6  5
Benefit/ton Low  0.6 0.6 0.6  0.6
 H i g h333   3
Net Benefits per ton  Low -0.2 -2 -5  -4
3% 
 High 2 -0.2 -3  -2
Annualized Cost    200 4,000 10,000  14,200
Annualized Benefit  Low  100 700 1,000  1,800
 High 600 3,000 5,000  8,600
Net Annual Benefits  Low -50 -3,000 -9,000  -12,050
  High 400 -400 -5,000 -5,000
Annualized tons of VOC  210 1,100 1,600 2,910
Cost/ton   0.9 3 6  5
Benefit/ton Low  0.6 0.6 0.6  0.6
 H i g h333   3
Net Benefits per ton  Low -0.3 -3 -5  -4
5% 
 High 2 -0.4 -3  -2
Annualized Cost    200 4,000 10,000  14,200
Annualized Benefit  Low  100 700 1,000  1,800
 High 600 3,000 5,000  8,600
Net Annual Benefits  Low -70 -3,000 -9,000  -12,070
  High 400 -600 -5,000 -5,200
Annualized tons of VOC  210 1,100 1,600 2,910
Cost/ton   0.9 3 6  5
Benefit/ton Low  0.6 0.6 0.6  0.6
 H i g h333   3
Net Benefits per ton  Low -0.3 -3 -5  -4
7% 
 High 2 -0.5 -3  -2
Notes: Cost numbers are based on Oommen (2006a), Oommen (2006b), Oommen (2006c) and Oommen (2006d). 
Benefit numbers are taken from EPA (1997) and updated using the Consumer Price Index. Net annual benefit values 
for the three control options will not equal the difference between costs and benefits due to rounding to one significant 
digit.  
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Table 2 
Present Value Estimates of the Costs and Benefits of Controlling Volatile Organic 
Compounds Based on a 30 year Regulation (in millions of 2003 dollars) 
    Net Present Value  Option 2     
   Cost   300    
   Benefit  Low  40    
     High  200    
    Net Benefit  Low -200    
   
3% 
 High  -100    
   Cost   200    
   Benefit  Low  30    
     High  100    
    Net Benefit  Low -200    
   
5% 
 High  -80    
   Cost   200    
   Benefit  Low  20    
     High  100    
    Net Benefit  Low -100    
   
7% 
 High  -70    
Notes: Cost numbers are based on Oommen (2006a), Oommen (2006b), Oommen (2006c) and Oommen (2006d). 
Benefit numbers are taken from EPA (1997) and updated using the Consumer Price Index. The length of the model is 
30 years. Numbers may not sum to totals due to rounding to one significant digit.  
              
 




This Appendix describes the definition of risk in detail and presents our modeling 
assumptions for the benefit-cost analysis and results from the sensitivity analysis. We 
found that our qualitative conclusions did not change with a range of discount rates, 
benefit numbers, cost assumptions, additional hazardous air pollutant benefits, and 
assumed length of project. 
  
1. Note on Risk 
 
  The cancer risks associated with inhalation exposure were calculated using 
lifetime cancer risk estimates, which assume 70 years of exposure 24 hours a day for all 
individuals in a given location. This does not necessarily represent the true risk, but rather 
a conservative risk level that is “an upper bound that is unlikely to be exceeded” (EPA, 
2006). The non-cancer risks were calculated using a hazard quotient and index which also 
assume continuous lifetime exposure (EPA, 1999, 127-128; EPA, 2006, 34428-34432). 
The maximum individual lifetime cancer risk associated with any source was estimated to 
be about 100 in one million, though a majority of facilities had risks of ten in one million 
or less (EPA, 2006, 34431).  
 




Costs consist of capital and operation and maintenance costs. On the cost side, we 
use EPA’s estimates from a number of documents, specifically from a series of 
memorandums from Roy Oommen, from the Eastern Research Group, Inc., to Randy 
McDonald, from EPA, OAQPS, located in the public docket (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-
OAR-2005-0475; Oommen, 2006a; Oommen, 2006b; Oommen, 2006c; Oommen, 
2006d). Cost estimates were based on results from 104 assessed facilities and 
extrapolated to the entire source category of 238 eligible facilities. We assume for 
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simplicity that the costs and benefits of the control measures are additive. This 
assumption appears reasonable given that the specified tons of hazardous air pollutants 
and volatile organic compounds reduced per year by each control measure individually 
sum to the specified total tons of hazardous air pollutants and VOC reduced per year for 
Option 2, which includes all three control measures. This assumption was also confirmed 




We correct for an error EPA appears to have made when calculating annualized 
capital costs for implementing storage tank control measures at one of the manufacturing 
plants. To calculate annualized capital costs, EPA multiplies the total estimated capital 
cost by the capital recovery factor, which was calculated assuming an interest rate and a 
specific repayment period. We vary this interest rate in our sensitivity analyses. For the 
storage tank control measures, the repayment period was 10 years (Oommen, 2006b). 
The costs for storage tank control measures consist of the cost of installing internal 
floating roofs on uncontrolled tanks that emit greater than 5 tons per year of hazardous air 
pollutants (EPA, 2006, 34434). For the process vent control measures, the repayment 
period was 15 years (Oommen, 2006c). The cost for process vent control measures 
consists of the cost of applying a thermal oxidizer on a vent stream based on various 
properties (EPA, 2006, 34433). There were no capital costs associated with the control 
measures to reduce the percentage of leaking valves (Oommen, 2006d). 
Although Oommen (2006b) calculates a capital recovery factor of 0.14 for storage 
tank control measures, the total capital cost of facility #254 of $304,488 was annualized 
to a recovery cost of $11,734.  This would imply a capital recovery factor closer to 0.06. 
The annualized recovery cost should be $42,628. This error was confirmed in a telephone 
conversation between Caroline Cecot and Roy Oommen on August 7
th, 2006.  
The effect is to raise control costs for this particular manufacturing plant by about 
70 percent. Because EPA scales all results to the national level by a factor of 2.3, this 
error compounds itself.  The effect is to raise the total control costs for storage tanks by 
about 50 percent. We ran the model with and without this change and it does not affect 
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our qualitative conclusions. The correction does affect the attractiveness of storage tank 
control measures. Control measures for storage tanks would have passed a benefit-cost 
test under the low-benefit per ton assumption for VOC emission reductions if we had not 




EPA assumes in the case of implementing control measures for storage tanks and 
for leaking valves that there is a “recovery credit” for product waste reduced. The source 
of this credit is unclear in EPA documentation. If the credit were eliminated, total costs 




EPA includes estimates of the tons of VOC reduced and the tons of hazardous air 
pollutants reduced. EPA uses 2,000 lbs per ton, confirmed in an email conversation 
between Caroline Cecot and Randy McDonald on August 14
th, 2006. We express cost 
and benefits per ton in terms of VOC.  Since hazardous air pollutants are a subset of 
volatile organic compounds, hazardous air pollutant reductions represent part of the VOC 
reduced. Thus, if we only focused on hazardous air pollutant reductions, we would not 
count benefits from other VOC that were reduced as part of the control measure. 
Incidentally, the cost per cancer case prevented of Option 2 is more than $1.3 billion, 
which does not account for many other important benefits, say, from the reduction of 
ozone. 
Unlike EPA, we consider non-cancer benefits such as ozone reductions as well as 
cancer benefits in our discussion. The benefit numbers come from an EPA (1997) 
regulatory impact assessment that specified a range of $444 to $2007 (1990 dollars) for 
each ton of VOC reduced. This defines a generic benefit number that includes the total 
value of the ozone health and welfare benefits from VOC reductions. We assume the 
phrase “health and welfare” incorporates both the adverse health effects caused by 
hazardous air pollutants, which includes cancer, and the adverse effects of VOC that 
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contribute to ozone. We do a sensitivity analysis in which we add the cancer reduction 
benefits calculated by EPA from hazardous air pollutant reductions to the total benefit 
ranges for VOC reduced and find that our qualitative conclusions do not change  
We assume these benefit numbers remain constant for each ton reduced. That is, 
we assume the marginal benefit curve is horizontal, which may be reasonable for small 
reductions in pollutants, but probably not reasonable for large reductions. A more 
extensive analysis involving modeling approaches would take into account a number of 
relevant factors, such as the potentially different contribution of hazardous air pollutants 
to ozone formation, and the corresponding effects these changes have on human health 
and welfare. For example, one would expect the dollar per ton benefit estimate to vary by 
location due to weather and population exposed, among other factors. 
EPA estimated that Option 2 would reduce annual cancer incidence by 0.01, or, 
prevent one cancer every 100 years for the exposed population. The generic benefit 
number for reducing a ton of VOC should already include the benefits of reducing 
hazardous air pollutants as well, so we do not add any additional benefits for hazardous 
air pollutants in our main calculation. We did a sensitivity analysis in which we added the 
monetary value of one life saved per 100 years in addition to the benefit numbers for each 
ton of VOC reduced, and found that our conclusions do not change even though this 
would tend to overestimate the benefits. This analysis is described below. We use the 
endpoints of the benefit range for the purposes of sensitivity. The benefit per ton ranges 
from about $600 to about $2800 (2003 dollars). EPA did not provide a most likely value, 
or we would have used that. We think, in general, it is good to include most likely or 
expected values in the primary analysis. 
 
3. Modeling Assumptions for the Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Hazardous air pollutant benefit 
 
The generic benefit number for reducing a ton of VOC should include the benefits 
of reducing hazardous air pollutants as well.  We present a sensitivity analysis in which 
we add the total benefit EPA estimates from cancer reduction for Option 2. EPA predicts 
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a cancer risk reduction of 0.01, which is statistically equivalent to preventing one cancer 
case every 100 years.  For simplicity, we assume that one cancer case is equal to one life. 
Given that the cancers associated with the hazardous air pollutants that resulted in the 
highest individual cancer risk estimates are leukemia and respiratory cancer—both 
terminal cancers—this assumption is reasonable. We use $6.8 million as our estimate of 
the value of a statistical life, which is the value of a statistical life estimate EPA advises 
its analysts to use, updated to 2003 dollars (Dockins et al., 2004). 
Since Option 2 is estimated to prevent one cancer every 100 years, we assumed 
that it saves 0.01 of the value of a statistical life each year, or $68,000 each year. This 
value is derived from annualized cancer risk reduction and the value of a statistical life, 
0.01 multiplied by $6.8 million. This did not change our qualitative results. A more 
complete analysis might consider the benefits of hazardous air pollutant reductions and 
non-hazardous air pollutant reductions separately. This is likely to yield a lower range for 
total benefits than the one we calculated by simply adding the cancer reduction benefits 
to total ozone reduction benefits. Thus, our sensitivity analysis would overstate the 
benefits if all of the other values were accurate. 
 
Length of model 
 
  For simplicity, given that the two required capital technologies had repayment 
periods of 10 and 15 years respectively, we assumed a 30 year length of model for our 
presentation of the net present value of the future costs of Option 2. Using a 15 year 
scenario reduces the present value by 32% and using a 60 year scenario increases the 
present value by 23% for a discount rate of 5%. Since the ratio of benefits to costs is the 
same no matter what length of model is assumed, this does not effect our qualitative 
conclusions.  
  We did not consider variations in the cost of implementing various control 
measures, nor did we consider possible interaction effects, but such analyses might be 
worthwhile doing. In doing these sensitivity analyses, we think it is useful to try to follow 
the Office of Management and Budget guidelines where they are appropriate. See Office 
of Management and Budget discussion on guidelines for regulatory analyses (2003). 
   